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Abstract Data envelopment analysis (DEA), a useful
assessment tool, has been used to solve the problem of
preference voting and aggregation which requires the
determination of the weights associated with different
ranking places. Instead of applying the same externally
imposed weighting scheme to all candidates, DEA models
allow each candidate to choose his/her own weights to
maximize his/her own overall ratings subject to certain
conditions. This paper proposes two new models to assess
the weights. The proposed models are linear programming,
which determine a common set of weights for all the
candidates. The proposed models are examined with two
numerical examples and it is shown that the proposed
models can not only choose a winner, but also give a full
ranking of all the candidates.
Keywords Scoring rules  Data envelopment analysis 
Preference voting
Introduction
In a preferential voting system, each voter selects a subset
of the candidates and places them in a ranked order. The
key issue of the preference aggregation in a preferential
voting system is how to determine the weights associated
with different ranking places. To avoid the subjectivity in
determining the weights, data envelopment analysis (DEA)
is used in Cook and Kress [2] to determine the most
favorable weights for each candidate. Different candidates
utilize different sets of weights to calculate their total
scores, which are referred to as the best relative total scores
and are all restricted to be  1. The candidate with the
biggest relative total score of one is said to be DEA effi-
cient and may be considered as a winner. This approach
proves to be effective, but very often leads to more than
one candidate to be DEA efficient. To choose a winner
from among the DEA-efficient candidates, Cook and Kress
[2] suggest maximizing the gap between the weights so that
only one candidate is left as DEA efficient. Green et al. [3]
suggest using the cross-efficiency evaluation method in
DEA to choose the winner. Noguchi et al. [7] also utilize
cross-efficiency evaluation technique to select the winner,
but present a strong ordering constraint on the weights.
Hashimoto [6] proposes the use of the DEA exclusion
model (i.e. super-efficiency model) to identify the winner.
Obata and Ishii [8] suggest excluding non-DEA-efficient
candidates and using normalized weights to discriminate
the DEA-efficient candidates. Their method is subse-
quently extended to rank non-DEA-efficient candidates by
Foroughi and Tamiz [4] and Foroughi et al. [5]. Recently,
Wang et al. [10] also propose three new models to assess
the weights and rank the candidates. Two of them are linear
programming models which determine a common set of
weights for all the candidates considered and the other is a
nonlinear programming model that determines the most
favourable weights for each candidate. But, Wang et al.
have not taken care of about making the weight of a certain
rank zero means that we throw away the corresponding part
of the obtained data. In actual applications, making the
weight of a certain rank zero means that we throw away the
corresponding part of the obtained rank voting data. Their
incorrect model also used in [9]. To avoid possible more
misapplications or spread in the future, we present in this
paper two improved DEA models to determine the weights
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of ranking places. The proposed models are simple, and
each of them can lead to a stable full ranking for all the
candidates considered. This will be illustrated with two
numerical examples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we develop the models for preference aggregation
to assess the weights associated with different ranking
places. We then examine two numerical examples using
the proposed models to illustrate their applications and
show their capabilities of identifying the winner and pro-
ducing a stable full ranking for all the candidates consid-
ered. Finally, we conclude the paper.
The models
Let wj be the relative importance weight attached to the jth
ranking place ðj ¼ 1; . . .; mÞ and vij be the vote of candidate
i being ranked in the jth place. The total score of each




vijwj; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n ð1Þ
which is a linear function of the relative importance
weights. Once the weights are given or determined, can-
didates can be ranked in terms of their total scores.
To determine the score of each candidate, Wang et al.
[10] suggest the following DEA model, which maximizes
the minimum of the total scores of the n candidates and





vijwj  1; i ¼ 1; . . .; n
w1  2w2     mwm  0;
ð2Þ
where w1  2w2     mwm  0 is the strong ordering
constraint on decision variables.
But, Wang et al. have not taken care of about making the
weight of a certain rank zero. In actual applications,
making the weight of a certain rank zero means that we
throw away the corresponding part of the obtained rank
voting data. Here, using an example we show this assertion.
Example 1 Consider the example in which 20 voters are
asked to rank two out of four candidates A–D on a ballot.
The votes each candidate receives are shown in Table 1.
If the model (2) is employed to solve the example then
we get a ¼ 0:4286; w1 ¼ 0:1429 and w2 ¼ 0:0000. As we
see the weight of second place is zero, which means that
the second place vote does not have any meaning. In actual
applications, making the weight of a certain place vote zero
means that we throw away the corresponding part of the
obtained data.
In what follows, we present our models, which avoid
producing a zero weight for a certain place vote and make
full use of all the data.
First model
Consider the following model,
max a
s:t: a Zi ¼
Pm
j¼1
vijwj  1; i ¼ 1; . . .; n
w1  2w2     mwm;
wm  e
ð3Þ
As a theoretical construct, e provides a lower bound for
scoring of grades to keep them away from zero. Hence, the
following LP is proposed to determine the e.




vijwj  1; i ¼ 1; . . .; n
w1  2w2     mwm;
wm  e 0
ð4Þ
It is clear that e ¼ 0; 8j : wj ¼ 0 is a feasible solution to the
model (4).
Lemma 1 The optimal value of model (4) is [0, that is
e [ 0:








vi1hi  d1 ¼ 0
Pn
i¼1
vijhi þ jdj1  jdj ¼ 0; j ¼ 2; . . .; m  1
Pn
i¼1
vimhi þ mdm1  dm ¼ 0
dm ¼ 1
hi; dj  0; i ¼ 1; . . .; n; j ¼ 1; . . .; m
ð5Þ
By contradiction assume that e ¼ 0. Hence,
h ¼Pni¼1 hi ¼ 0. Therefore according to the constraints
of model (5), for all j ¼ 1; . . .; m, we have dj ¼ 0 which
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contradicts to the last constraint of model (5), So
e ¼ h [ 0. h




























But according to the constraints of model (3) for each












; i ¼ 1; . . .; n: On the other hand
















Theorem 1 The optimal value of model (4) is [0 and
bounded.
Proof The proof is clear using the above lemmas.






vijwj  1; i ¼ 1; . . .; n
w1  2w2     mwm  0
ð6Þ
Proof From the last constraint of model (5) we have








vi1hi  d1 ¼ 0
Pn
i¼1
vijhi þ jdj1  jdj ¼ 0; j ¼ 2; . . .; m  1
Pn
i¼1
vimhi þ mdm1 ¼ 1
hi; dj  0; i ¼ 1; . . .; n; j ¼ 1; . . .; m  1
ð7Þ





vijwj  1; i ¼ 1; . . .; n
w1  2w2     mwm  0
ð8Þ
But we know that the dual of the dual is primal, thus the
above model is the same as model (4). h
By solving model (4) for data of Table 1, we have
e ¼ 0:04545. If this e is employed to solve the model (3),
for example, 1 we get a ¼ 0:36364; w1 ¼ 0:9091 and
w2 ¼ 0:04545. Hence, the ranking of the four candidates is
as: B  A  C  D: Therefore, candidate B is the winner.
Second model
To avoid producing a zero weight for the last ranking place
and make full use of all the data, we propose that model (2)
be modified as
max aþ wm
s:t: a Zi ¼
Pm
j¼1
vijwj; i ¼ 1; . . .; n





which maximizes a and the minimum weight wm at the
same time. By solving the above modified model for
example 1, we got the unique optimal solution a ¼
1:0000; w1 ¼ 0:6667 and w2 ¼ 0:3333. The ranking of the
four candidates generated by the above model is
B  A  C  D, which consistent with model (3).
Numerical examples
In this section, we examine two numerical examples using
the proposed models to illustrate their applications and
show their capabilities of choosing the winner and ranking
candidates.
Example 2 Consider the example investigated by Cook
and Kress [2] and Wang et al. [10] in which 20 voters are
asked to rank four out of six candidates A–F on a ballot. The
votes that each candidate receives are shown in Table 2.
By solving (4), we get e ¼ 0:02727. Now the model (3)
yields a ¼ 0:43636; w1 ¼ 0:10909; w2 ¼ 0:05455; w3 ¼
0:03636 and w4 ¼ 0:02727. Solving the model (8), we have:
a ¼ 1:0000; w1 ¼ 0:4800; w2 ¼ 0:2400; w3 ¼ 0:1600 and
w4 ¼ 0:1200. The rankings of the six candidates produced
Table 2 Votes received by six candidates
Candidate First place Second place Third place Fourth place
A 3 3 4 3
B 4 5 5 2
C 6 2 3 2
D 6 2 2 6
E 0 4 3 4
F 1 4 3 3
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by the two models are shown in Table 3, from which it is clear
that the two models all lead to the same ranking, that is,
D  B  C  A  F  E. Therefore, candidate D is the
winner.
Example 3 Consider the example investigated by Obata
and Ishii [8] and Foroughi and Tamiz [4], in which seven
candidates A–G are ranked. Table 4 shows the votes each
candidate receives in the first two places.
Using the model (4), we have e ¼ 0:01316. Now, by
solving model (3) we get a ¼ 0:39474; w1 ¼ 0:02632 and
w2 ¼ 0:01316. Solving the model (9), we have: a ¼
1:0000; w1 ¼ 0:6667 and w2 ¼ 0:3333. The rankings of the
seven candidates generated by the two models are shown in
Table 5. As can be seen from Table 5, our models lead to
the same ranking, B  A  E  F  D  C  G. There-
fore, candidate B is the winner.
Conclusion
We discussed the applicability of the ranking method
proposed by Wang et al. By using DEA, we determine the
weights from rank voting data. Their model, gives rise to
the case such that the data of some rank are ignored. Thus,
we analyze the procedure to determine weights, and pro-
posed two extended models for preference voting and
aggregation. The contribution of this paper is to maintain
the effects of all data in the final solution, an improvement
over the model proposed by Wang et al.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
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References
1. Brams, S.J., Fishburn, P.C.: Voting procedures. In: Arrow, K.J.,
Sen, A.K., Suzumura K. (eds.) Handbook of social choice and
welfare, vol. 1, p. 226. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2002)
2. Cook, W.D., Kress, M.: A data envelopment model for aggre-
gating preference rankings. Manag. Sci. 36, 1302–1310 (1990)
3. Green, R.H., Doyle, J.R., Cook, W.D.: Preference voting and
project ranking using DEA and cross-evaluation. Eur. J. Oper.
Res. 90(3), 461–472 (1996)
4. Foroughi, A.A., Tamiz, M.: An effective total ranking model for
a ranked voting system. Omega 33, 491–496 (2005)
5. Foroughi, A.A., Jones, D.F., Tamiz, M.: A selection method for a
preferential election. Appl. Math. Comput. 163, 107–116 (2005)
6. Hashimoto, A.: A ranked voting system using a DEA/AR
exclusion model: a note. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 97, 600–604 (1997)
7. Noguchi, H., Ogawa, M., Ishii, H.: The appropriate total ranking
method using DEA for multiple categorized purposes. J. Comput.
Appl. Math. 146, 155–166 (2002)
8. Obata, T., Ishii, H.: A method for discriminating efficient candidates
with ranked voting data. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 151, 233–237 (2003)
9. Wang, Y.M., Liu, J., Elhag, T.M.S.: An integrated AHP–DEA
methodology for bridge risk assessment. Comput. Ind. Eng. 54,
513–525 (2008)
10. Wang, Y.M., Chin, K.S., Yang, J.B.: Three new models for
preference voting and aggregation. J. Oper. Res. Soc. 58(10),
1389–1393 (2007)
Table 3 Scores and rankings of the six candidates by proposed
models
Candidate First model Second model
Score Rank Score Rank
A 0.71818 4 3.16000 4
B 0.94546 2 4.16000 2
C 0.92727 3 4.08000 3
D 1.00000 1 4.40000 1
E 0.43636 6 1.92000 6
F 0.51818 5 2.28000 5













Table 5 Scores and rankings of the seven candidates by proposed
models
Candidate First model Second model
Score Rank Score Rank
A 0.97369 2 24.66677 2
B 1.00000 1 25.33333 1
C 0.81579 6 20.66667 6
D 0.88158 5 22.33333 5
E 0.96053 3 24.33333 3
F 0.89474 4 22.66677 4
G 0.39474 7 10.00000 7
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